By John Taber
This can be a translation of the bankruptcy on notion of Kumarilabhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika, one of many vital texts of the Hindu reaction to the feedback of the logical-epistemological tuition of Buddhist proposal. In an in depth observation, the writer explains the process the argument from verse to verse and alludes to different theories of classical Indian philosophy and different technical concerns. Notes to the interpretation and observation move extra into the ancient and philosophical historical past of Kumarila's rules. The publication presents an advent to the background and the advance of Indian epistemology, a synopsis of Kumarila's paintings and an research of its argument.
Read Online or Download A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumarila on Perception: The “Determination of Perception” chapter of Kumarila Bhatta’s Slokavarttika: Translation and commentary PDF
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Extra info for A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumarila on Perception: The “Determination of Perception” chapter of Kumarila Bhatta’s Slokavarttika: Translation and commentary
Rather, on the view that the expression is superimposed on its meaning, each would be taken as referring, in effect, to itself, hence to different things (195–198). On the other hand, the use of a synonym to paraphrase another word would be indistinguishable from the use of two words in grammatical coordination (199). Certainly, Kum¯arila continues, when one learns what a word means, that is, the convention that assigns the word to its meaning, one is aware of the meaning 27 INTRODUCTION as distinct from the word.
When I enter a dark room from bright sunlight I do not immediately apprehend the objects around me, even though they are within range of my visual sense; similarly, I am not immediately, upon the first visual apprehension of an object from a distance, able to discern all of its features. Thus, a distinct, conceptualized cognition of an object can arise after an initial indistinct, nonconceptualized one and still be a perception (126–127). However, this should not be taken to imply that any cognition following upon the connection of sense faculty and object, whether immediately or not, is a perception.
Any suggestion that the s¯utra provides a definition of perception should be rejected, Kum¯arila maintains, if it does not specify an appropriate reading of the s¯utra (12, 14). 4. 4, he suggests, is not to define perception at all but simply to indicate a well-known feature that rules it out as a means of knowing Dharma. That feature is, namely, that it arises from an existing connection between a sense faculty and an object; hence it can only apprehend an object that is “present” – here and now (17–18).